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SECURITY INTERESTS ON EXEMPT PROPERTY 
AFTER THE 1994 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE 
DAVID GRAY CARLSON* 
The Bankruptcy Code1 permits debtors to avoid certain security interests on 
certain categories of exempt property. Such an innovation extends the concept of 
exempt property from its traditional domain, which placed exempt property beyond 
the reach of judgment creditors. Historically, it was always thought that the debtor 
could give away exempt property. Hence, there was nothing traditionally wrong 
with the debtor's consent to a security interest on this property. Such a security 
interest could be enforced like any other. 
Starting the 1970s, however, consumer advocates discovered that nonpurchase-
money, nonpossessory security interests in consumer goods were pernicious. The 
Federal Trade Commission declared them to be an unfair trade practice by secured 
creditors.2 In conjunction with this declaration, Congress enacted section 522(f)(l) 
of the Bankruptcy Code to permit avoidance of these security interests when they 
encumber certain II core II exempt property. 3 The theory behind this avoidance is that 
debtors may too easily have signed adhesion contracts with secured creditors, 
blanketing all their consumer goods with liens. 4 These consumer goods had no 
intrinsic value on the market, but the security interest gave secured creditors an 
• Of Counsel, Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law, Yeshiva University. 
I 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994). 
2 FfC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1994). See Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: 
Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 415 (1988) 
(stating that FfC prohibits nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests). 
3 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 522(t), 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l) (1994). Section 522(t)(l), after 
extensive amendments in 1994, reads as follows: 
Id. 
Notwithstanding any waiverof exemptions but subjectto paragraph (3), the debtor may avoid 
the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an 
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if 
such lien is-
(B) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(i) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, 
animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, 
family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; 
(ii) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade 
of a dependent of the debtor; or 
(iii) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the 
debtor. 
4 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6088 
(stating these liens are often used by over-reaching creditors to their advantage). 
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unfair coercive power over debtors who could not or would not pay , back their 
loans.5 
Section 522(t)6 was like a great many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as it 
was first enacted; it was very prodebtor and. hence, at least on an anecdotal level, 
capable of spectacular abuse. Debtors could avoid very large security interests on 
very expensive items by proving the items were "tools of the trade" within the 
meaning of section 522(t)(l)(B)(ii).7 Thus, in Rainier Equipment Finance, Inc. v. 
Taylor (In re Taylor), 8 to give one example, the debtor was able to show that a 
$52,000 logging truck was a tool of the trade and, of course, the nonpu,rchase-
money security interest on it had to go. 9 
Creditors learned to hate this avoidance power and commenced a long campaign 
to undercut it. 10 Their first initiative was by means of state law .11 If state law 
allowed exemption of the debtor's equity in a thing (as opposed to the thing-in-
itselt), then secured creditors could justly argue that the security interest did not 
"impair" the exemption, as section 522(t)(l)(B) avoidance requires.12 Since only 
the debtor equity was exempt, the security interest could eliminate the exemption 
simply by assuring that no debtor equity existed. 13 
Such a state-law theory was obliterated by the Supreme Court in Owen v. 
Owen, 14 where the Court implied that security interest~ on exempt property could 
be destroyed regardless of the content of state exemption law. 15 After Owen, 
secured creditors needed federal intervention to prevent what they took to be debtor 
abuses of the section 522(t)(l)(B) avoidance power. Accordingly, Congress, in 
1994, added two new subsections to section 522(t). 16 One subsection, contrary to 
5 Id. 
6 11 U.S.C. § 522(t) (1988), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 522(t) (1994). 
1 See Production Credit Ass'n v. LaFond (In re LaFond), 791 F.2d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 1986) (Heaney, J.) 
(allowing liens on large valuable farm equipment to be avoided because it was a tool of the trade); Middleton 
v. Farmers State Bank (In re Middleton), 45 B.R. 744, 747 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (Connelly, J .) (same); 
Yparrea v. Roswell Prod. Credit Ass'n (In re Yparrea), 16 B.R. 33, 34 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1981) (Johnson, 
J.) (same). 
8 73 B.R. 149 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (Ashland, J.), aff'd, 861 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1988). 
9 Taylor, 73 B.R. at 152. 
10 See Hon. Roger M. Whelan et al., Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Balancing the Equities in Chapter 13, 
2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 186 (1994) (indicating creditor movement to amend § 522(t) in order 
to take a more limited approach to lien avoidance). 
11 See ITT Fin. Servs. v. Fox (In re Fox), 902 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1990) (Garwood, J.) (finding 
Mississippi exemption statute did not allow debtor to avoid lien by secured creditor on otherwise exempt 
property); Bessent v. United States (In re Bessent), 831 F.2d 82, 83 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J.) (Louisiana) 
(finding Texas statute did not allow for avoidance of lien); Spears v. Thorp Credit, Inc. (In re Spears), 744 
F.2d 1225, 1225-26 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (reaching same outcome under Ohio law). 
12 David Gray Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Personal Property: Their Fate in Bankruptcy, 2 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 247, 259-60 (1993). 
13 Id. 
14 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (Scalia, J.). 
15 Id. at 313-14. 
16 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, § 303, 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2), (3) (1994). 
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the general esprit of the 1994 amendments, is actually prodebtor.17 New section 
522(t)(2) defines "impairment" of an exemption in a way that reverses some 
procreditor case law on what impairment means. 18 This new definition conforms 
to the definition assumed in Owen v. Owen. 19 
The second subsection is rigorously procreditor. The new section 522(t)(3) 
repeals avoidances otherwise available under section 522(t)(l)(B).20 It does so only 
when the collateral is, in its unencumbered state, worth more than $5000.21 But 
this defense against avoidance surely counts as one of the most densely confusing 
pieces of legislation ever enacted this side of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The purpose of this Article is to work out a theory of what these new provisions 
mean. 22 As the new amendments react primarily to Owen v. Owen, Part I 
discusses that case in detail, in order to show its relevance to secured creditors 
claiming exempt property as collateral. It also shows how newly enacted section 
522(t)(3) partially reverses Owen, but only after testing the quality of state 
exemption legislation. As we shall see, the test is very confush1g indeed. To date, 
it has been revealed that Minnesota is free and clear of reform. 23 Whether other 
states will also join Minneso~a's secessionary instinct depends on·how courts read 
the deeply confusing conditions precedent in section 522(t)(3). 
Part II explores the new definition of "impairment" that Congress has added. 
If section 522(t)(3) is baffling, the new definition of impairment is not; it is 
straightforward and sensible-not to mention very prodebtor. Part III uses this 
definition of impairment to illustrate how the new defense against lien avoidance 
works. As we shall see, the defense has some very surprising features-all of them 
very procreditor and many of them highly arbitrary. Under certain circumstances, 
debtors will find that their section 522(t)(l) avoidance power will have no effect; 
rather, the nonpurchase-money security interests on their exempt property will be 
entirely upheld against the avoidance that section 522(t)(l)(B) describes. 
I. OWEN V. OWEN 
According to section 522(t)(l): "the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on 
an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an 
17 See H.R. REP. No. 835, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 52-54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 
3361-63 (indicating Congress intended to overrule several procreditor cases). 
18 Id. at 52, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3361. 
19 Id. 
20 11 u.s.c. § 522(t)(3) (1994). 
ii Id. 
22 As this essay focuses on the meaning of the 1994 amendments, it does not discuss a great many issues 
under § 522(t)(l)(B). I have attempted to perform this task elsewhere. See Carlson, supra note 12, at 274 
(containing a detailed discussion of pre-1994 § 522(t)). 
23 See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text. 
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exemption. "24 If state legislation exempts only debtor equity in collateral, it 
arguably follows that the security interest is not subject to section 522(t)(l) 
avoidance. 25 In such a case, the security interest does not "impair an exemption" 
within the meaning of section 522(t)(l).26 And if the security interest does not 
encumber exempt property, then section 522(t)(l) cannot perform its obliterative 
function on the security interest at all. 27 
Initially, some courts so ruled, and as a result, when a state exemption law was 
felicitously worded, secured parties could preserve their nonpurchase-money 
security interests.28 In Owen v. Owen,29 however, the Supreme Court implied that 
security interests on exempt property can be destroyed regardless of the content of 
state exemption law. 30 Owen concerned a judicial lien on exempt property, 31 
something covered by section 522(t)(l)(A) and not section 522(t)(l)(B). 32 
Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning is fully applicable to both provisions. 33 
In Owen, an ex-wife had already obtained a judgment against her ex-husband 
24 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l) (1994). 
25 Carlson, supra note 12, at 259. 
26 Id. A similar phenomenon exists with regard to property of the estate. According to § 541(a)(l), only 
the debtor's interest in property enters the estate, leaving the implication that the security interest is beyond 
the jurisdiction of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (1994). It is necessary to deny this implication in 
order to affirm a bankruptcy trustee's power to use, sell or lease illiquid collateral under§ 363(b). See David 
Gray Carlson, The Dubious Foundations of Securitization 10-13 (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). 
27 Apparently, some states even amended their exemption statutes to help secured parties achieve this 
implication. See James B. Haines, Jr., Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtors' Bankruptcy Exemptions in 
a Sorry State, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 25-26 (1983). 
28 See ITT Fin. Servs. v. Fox (In re Fox), 902 F.2d 411,414 (5th Cir. 1990) (Garw~od, J.) (reaching this 
result under Mississippi law); Bessent v. United States (In re Bessent), 831 F.2d 82, 83-84 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(Jones, J .) (Louisiana); Spears v. Thorp Credit, Inc. (In re Spears), 744 F.2d 1225, 1225-26 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam) (Ohio law); Allen v. Hale County State Bank (In re Allen), 725 F.2d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 
1984) (Politz, J.) (Texas); Giles v. Credithrifi of America, Inc. (In re Pine), 717 F.2d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 
1983) (Merritt, J.) (Tennessee and Georgia), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 928 (1984). For a rare case of rebellion 
by a lower court against the governing authorities of the Fifth Circuit, see In re Thompson, 59 B.R. 690, 
692 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986). Here Judge Glen Ayers wrote: "Were the Fifth Circuit confronted with Allen 
today, it would almost certainly not render the same decision." Id. at 695. The prediction proved incorrect, 
as the Fifth Circuit has reiterated its position at least twice since Allen, in Fox and Bessent. 
Other courts thought that if any part of the item is exemptible-if the debtor's equity may be reserved 
by the debtor-then § 522(t)(l)(B) may destroy any security interest on the item. See Aetna Fin. Co. v. 
Leonard (In re Leonard), 866 F.2d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1989) (Brorby, J.); Hall v. Finance One, Inc. (In 
re Hall), 752 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1985) (Kravitch, J.); Brown v. Dellinger (In re Brown), 734 F.2d 
119, 125 (2d Cir. 1984) (Kearse, J.); Maddox v. Southern Discount Co. (In re Maddox), 713 F.2d 1526, 
1530 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 
29 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (Scalia, J.). 
30 See id. at 313-14 (concluding that Florida's exclusion of certain liens from scope of its homestead 
protection does not achieve a similar exclusion from Bankruptcy Code's lien avoidance provision). 
31 Id. at 309. 
32 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l)(A) (1994). 
33 Tower Loan, Inc. v. Maddox (In re Maddox), 15 F.3d 1347, 1351 (5th Cir. 1994) (Wiener, J.); In re 
Wink, 137 B.R. 297, 300 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1992) (Utschig, J.). 
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when the latter bought a condominium apartment. 34 The judicial lien attached to 
the condo upon · acquisition, pursuant to standard after-acquired property 
assumptions. 35 The next year, Florida allowed condos to be exempt property, but 
it preserved any pre-existing judicial liens. 36 Therefore, under state law the ex-wife 
had a valid judicial lien, even though the condo was itself exempt from all future 
judgment liens. 37 
Section 522(f)(l)(A) authorizes avoidance of judicial liens "to the extent that 
such lien impairs an exemption t<? which the debtor would have been entitled under 
subsection (b)" of section 522.38 The debtor reasoned that, because of the 
emphasized subjunctive language, section 522(f)(l)(A) permitted the avoidance of 
the judicial lien on the exempt property. 39 The ex-wife was of the view that the 
judicial lien did not impair the exemption, within the meaning of section 522(f), and 
so the lien should stand. 40 
Justice Antonin Scalia ruled that the judicial lien could be avoided. "To 
determine the application of [section] 522(f), "41 Scalia wrote, courts interpreting 
34 Owen, 500 U.S. at 307. 
35 Id. at 306-07. 
36 Id. at 307. 
31 Id. 
38 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l)(A) (1994) (emphasis added). 
39 Owen, 500 U.S. at 311-12. 
40 Scalia thought that the ex-wife's argument had some merit, but he worried about its consistency with 
what he termed a "uniform practice of bankruptcy courts," regarding the federal exemptions that most states 
have opted out of. Id. at 310. The federal rule allows exemption of "the debtor's interest" in the listed items. 
11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1994). This implies that only debtor equity is exempt. If the ex-wife were right, then 
§ 522(f) could never invalidate an effective judicial lien (or perfected security interest) on a federally exempt 
item of property. Yet bankruptcy courts routinely allowed § 522(f) to avoid otherwise valid liens on federally 
exempt items. See, e.g., In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1982) (Cummings, J.). 
This attitude seems entirely correct. The idea of the federal exemptions was to correct for the fact that 
many states had not amended their debtor-creditor laws since the nineteenth century. See William J. 
Woodward, Jr., Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 341-42 (1982). 
Hence, many of the exemptions were pitiful by modern standards. Congress allowed debtors to have 
potentially better federal exemptions, but if states consciously thought highly enough of their own systems, 
they could "opt out" of the federal system in favor of exclusive state governance. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) 
(1994). 
Suppose a state permits the choice of federal exemptions, but the federal exemption protects only "the 
debtor's interest" in a given item. A judicial lien under state law might attach to such an item, reducing the 
"debtor's interest" in the item to zero. If the judicial lien on the item remained unavoidable, the debtor 
would gain nothing from the federal exemption. Owen, 500 U.S. at 310; C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt 
Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV. 265, 272-73 (1992). 
It was necessary, then, that such judicial liens be destroyed by § 522(f)(l), so that the federal exemptions 
might do the debtor some good. See Robert H. Bowmar, Avoidance of Judicial Liens that Impair Exemptions 
in Bankruptcy: The Workings of 11 U.S.C. § 522(1)(1), 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 387-88 n.85 (1989) 
(discussing New York's bankruptcy-only exemptions, to which judicial liens might attach). 
Given this attitude toward federal exemptions, Scalia saw no valid reason to distinguish the state-law 
exemptions and so, in the interest of uniformity, he ruled that otherwise valid liens could be destroyed under 
§ 522(f). Owen, 500 U.S. at 313-14. 
41 Id. at 310-11. 
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the federal exemption must "ask not whether the lien impairs an exemption to which 
the debtor is in fact entitled, but whether it impairs an exemption to which he would 
have been entitled but for the lien itself. "42 This principle, applied to the Florida 
exemption, implies that the debtor gets, not the exemptions to which she is entitled, 
but to what she would have been entitled if the lien did not exist. 43 Thus, section 
522(f)(l) destroyed the Florida judicial lien, and once again an ex-husband was 
allowed to escape the family obligations that both positive and natural law 
demand. 44 
This reasoning directly affects Article 9 security interests under section 
42 Id. at 310-11 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This past subjunctive tense demands a ",but for" 
against which the debtor is to be protected. One "but for" might be found in the opening words of 
§ 522(f)-"Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions .... " This harmless "but for" would allow the ex-
wife's judicial lien to survive. 
Scalia rejected this argument, because the opening word "Notwithstanding" had already dispensed with 
the waiver. Given that the waiver had been neutralized, the "but-for" of the "would have been" must be 
something other than the waiver. Id. at 310. "The only other conceivable possibility is but for a 
waiver-harking back to the beginning phrase of§ 522(f) .... The use of contrary-to-fact construction after 
a 'notwithstanding' phrase is not, however, common usage, if even permissible." Id. at 311. Furthermore, 
the destruction of waivers in § 522(f) is merely an aside. The main point of § 522(f) is to destroy liens, 
suggesting that the "but for" must be aimed at the lien, not the waiver of exemption. Id. at 312. 
One argument not available to Justice Scalia, who interpreted § 522(f)(l)(A), applies to 
§ 522(f)(l)(B)-the creation of a security interest in exempt property can be viewed as a waiver of the 
exemption; hence, § 522(f)(l)(B) should destroy security interests "notwithstanding waiver," to quote the 
opening words of§ 522(f). See McManus v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re McManus), 681 F.2d 353, 358 
(5th Cir. 1982) (Dyer, J., dissenting). 
43 Owen, 500 U.S. at 311. One aspect of the case, emphasized in Justice Stevens' dissent, is that Mr. 
Owen's condo became exempt only after Mrs. Owen's judicial lien encumbered the asset. Id. at 315 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, on the logic of the majority opinion, it ought to be possible in general 
to disencumber collateral that was never exempt by rendering it exempt. For example, suppose a debtor 
brings home encumbered office furniture, thereby rendering the furniture exempt. The security interest on 
that office furniture should effectively disappear, so long as it was of the nonpurchase-money variety. See 
Tower Loan, Inc. v. Maddox (In re Maddox), 15 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (Wiener, J.) (security 
interest on nonexempt property could be avoided if debtor later designated the collateral as exempt per 
Mississippi law); In re Hilary, 76 B.R. 683, 685 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (Kresse!, J.) (violin used for 
business could be converted into home instrument, though exemption disallowed for other reasons). But see 
In re Rader, 144 B.R. 864, 866 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (Koger, J.) (concluding judicial lien attached first 
and the property was ruled exempt after the fact); In re Goodwin, 133 B.R. 141, 144 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 
1990) (Vandivier, J.) (estopping debtor's claim that furniture was exempt household furnishing because 
secured party relied on representation that furniture was for office). 
44 Cf In re Mayer, 156 B.R. 54, 59 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993) (Adler, J .). Mayer held the use of§ 522(f) 
to reduce valid judicial lien an unconstitutional taking. Id. It is hard indeed to reconcile Mayer with Owen 
v. Owen, which palpably allows the reduction of a judicial lien that was valid under state law. Owen, 50 
U.S. at 313-14. 
It may also be noted that the 1994 amendments to§ 522(f)(l)(A) prevent the avoidance of any judicial 
lien related to family obligations. 140 CONG. REC. Hl0,752, Hl0,770 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994). These 
amendments were specifically intended to expand the scope of Farrey v. Sanderfoot, which held a former 
husband could not avoid a judicial lien on a residence previously owned jointly with his former wife. Id. 
(citing Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991)). 
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522(f)(l)(B).45 Hence, Owen briefly settled that, whatever the content of local state 
exemption law, section 522(f)(l)(B) is competent to destroy any otherwise valid 
security interest on the specific exempt items listed in section 522(f)(l)(B).46 
Through the subjunctive reasoning invoked by Justice Scalia, which emphasized 
what "would have been" exempt but for the security interest, state legislation could 
not whittle down the avoidance power in section 522(f)(l)(B).47 
In order to reverse the most extreme implications of Owen, Congress, in 1994, 
added a confusing new subsection to section 522(f). New section 522(f)(3) reads 
as follows: 
In a case in which State law that is applicable to the debtor-
(A) permits a person to voluntarily waive a right to claim 
exemptions under subsection ( d) or prohibits a debtor from 
claiming exemptions under subsection (d); and 
(B) either permits the debtor to claim exemptions under State 
law without limitation in amount, except to the extent that the 
debtor has permitted the fixing of a consensual lien on any property 
or prohibits avoidance of a consensual lien on property otherwise 
eligible to be claimed as exempt property; 
the debtor may not avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor or 
a dependent of the debtor in property if the lien is a nonpossessory, 
nonpurchase-money security interest in implements, professional books, or 
tools of the trade of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor or farm animals 
or crops of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor to the extent the value 
of such implements, professional books, tools of the trade, animals, and 
crops exceeds $5000. 48 
This section is supposed to repeal Owen with regard to big ticket "tools of the 
trade" that might be exempt, but not to the smaller, more modest items.49 Owen 
45 See 11 U .S.C. § 522(t)(l)(B) (1994) (allowing avoidance of security interest in various types of personal 
property to extent lien impairs an exemption). 
46 Owen, 500 U.S. at 313. On the other hand, in In re Johnson, 179 B.R. 800 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995), 
the debtor tried to claim a car as exempt which was encumbered by an unperfected purchase money security 
interest. Id. at 801-02. Virginia has an exemption statute that prevents any property from being exempt when 
purchase money debt is still outstanding, even if the purchase money debt is unsecured. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-5(1) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1995). Nothing in Owen could help the debtor in her quest to disencumber 
the car. Even if we suspended the lien per Justice Scalia's instruction, the car still would not be exempt. 
47 See Owen, 500 U.S. at 313 (indicating that identical reasoning is applicable to both federal and state 
exemptions). 
48 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(3) (1994). 
49 See 140 CONG. REC. S4640, S4645 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (statement of Sen. Johnston) (indicating 
that it was the effect of Owen on agricultural borrowers that was the primary motivational force). 
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continues to apply when the collateral is worth less than $5000.50 
The effect of section 522(f)(3) is to roll back the avoidance accomplished in 
section 522(f)(l)(B).51 Before observing how this defensive rollback of avoidance 
works, it is necessary to acquire a firm grasp of Congress's new definition of 
"impairment" under section 522(f)(2). 
II. IMPAIRMENT 
If a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest encumbers a qualified 
household good or tool of the trade, it does not follow that the debtor may avoid 
the entire security interest.52 Rather, section 522(f)(l)(B) avoids nonpurchase-
money security interests only "to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption. "53 
If the entire thing is exempt, then the very existence of the security interest always 
impairs the exemption. But when the debtor may only exempt a certain dollar 
amount of the collateral, lien avoidance might be partial only. 54 This makes it 
necessary to calculate the amount of the lien avoidance. 
In 1994, Congress, responding to pell-mell havoc and confusion in the case 
law,55 defined impairment in new section 522(f)(2): 
(A) For the purposes of this subsection, a lien shall be considered to 
impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of-
(i) the lien, 
(ii) all other liens on the property; and 
(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if 
there were no liens on the property; 
exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in 
the absence of any liens. 56 
50 This follows by negative implication because the § 522(t)(3) limitation on avoidance only applies when 
the collateral's value exceeds $5000. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(3) (1994). 
51 See id. (indicating that, if applicable, debtor "may not avoid" liens subsection (1) would allow). 
52 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l) (1994). 
53 Id. § 522(t)(l)(B) .. 
54 See id. 
55 See generally Paulette J. Delk, Lien Avoidance Under Section 522(1) of the Bankruptcy Code: The 
Winding Road to the Supreme Court, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 881-83 (1991) (discussing how 
concurrent enactment of§ 522(b) created difficulty for courts trying to apply§ 522(t)); Lawrence Kalevitch, 
Lien Avoidance on Exemptions: The False Controversy Over Opt-Out, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 443, 444 (1991) 
(discussing how courts and commentators had reached incorrect conclusions under pre-1994 avoidance 
provision). 
56 11 U.S.C. § 522(t){2)(A) (1994). According to the legislative history, this formulation was adopted in 
In re Brantz, 106 B.R. 62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). 140 CONG. REC. Hl0,752, Hl0,769 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 
1994). Additionally, Brantz was cited with favor in Owen. See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 313 n.5 
(1991) (Scalia, J.). 
j 
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To illustrate the nature of the required calculation, suppose that a car is deemed 
a "tool of the trade" within the meaning of section 522(f)(l)(B)(ii), thereby entitling 
the debtor to some avoidance of a nonpurchase-money security interest on this 
"tool. "57 If only one avoidable lien exists on the motor vehicle, this dollar limit 
poses no complexity. For instance, suppose a bankruptcy trustee sells a motor 
vehicle for $2650, and A has a nonpurchase-money security interest on the motor 
vehicle for $600. Section 522(f)(l)(B) avoids a nonpurchase-money security interest 
only to the extent "such lien impairs an exemption, "58 per the above definition. 
According to that definition, impairment-and hence avoidance-is calculated by 
adding the targeted lien ($600), all other liens ($0), and the debtor's exemption 
($2400 if the federal car exemption59 applies). 60 From this sum ($3000) we 
subtract the unencumbered value of the debtor's interest ($2650). 61 Avoidance 
therefore equals $350; the secured party obtains the amount of the lien minus the 
avoidance ($600 - 350 = $250).62 The debtor takes the rest ($2400), which of 
course, equates with the amount of the exemption. 63 
This formula replicates the philosophy of Owen v. Owen. 64 That is, according 
to Justice Scalia's suggestion, we are to imagine what the debtor could have 
exempted if there were no security interests at all. 65 Only after we imagine away 
the security interests do we test whether or not they impair the debtor's 
exemption. 66 
One unanswered question, however, is whether, after the lien avoidance occurs 
and the trustee abandons the collateral, the secured party's claim is capable of 
growing through the accrual of interest and attorneys' fees called for by the security 
agreement. The answer ought to be that, since the $350 represents a cap on the 
secured claim, the secured claim is presumably not capable of growing beyond this 
amount. 
Even though the claim's upside growth is frozen, the secured creditor takes the 
risk of depreciation over time. 67 Because the debtor has a permanent right to 
recover $2400 out of the exempt property in the above example, the secured party 
57 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l)(B)(ii) (1994). 
58 Id. § 522(t)(l)(B). 
59 Id. § 522(d)(2). 
60 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). 
61 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
62 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2)(A) (1994). 
63 Id. § 522(t)(l). 
64 500 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1991) (Scalia, J.). 
65 Id. at 311. 
66 Id. at 312. 
67 For a discussion of how depreciation and appreciation affect secured creditors, see Margaret Howard, 
Multiple Judicial Liens inBankruptcy:Section522(f)(l) Simplified, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 151, 173-75 (1993). 
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takes all the risk that the collateral will depreciate over time. 68 In essence, the 
debtor is the senior lien creditor and A is a junior lien creditor suffering from a cap 
on her lien. On fortune's cap, she is not the very button.69 
Suppose now that two security interests encumber the motor vehicle-one 
belonging to A, who is senior, and the other belonging to B, who is junior. A 
claims $600 and B claims $4000. Suppose both of these security interests are 
voidable, because the motor vehicle is a "tool" under section 522(f)(l)(B)(ii) and 
these are nonpurchase-money security interests.70 The value of the car is still 
$2650. 
Applying the definition literally, we must calculate twice, because there are two 
nonpurchase-money security interests on the collateral. Although section 522(f)(2) 
does not say so, it is very important that the most junior lien •first be subjected to 
calculative scrutiny. Last in right is first in calculation. Otherwise, the senior lieri 
will be avoided and the junior lien will survive. 
Accordingly, with regard to the $4000 junior lien, we add the amount of that 
lien ($4000), the amount of all other liens ($600),71 and the amount of the 
exemption ($2400). 72 From this sum ($7000), we subtract the value of the car 
($2650), for a total of $4350. This constitutes the amount of avoidance to which 
the debtor is entitled. 73 Therefore, the $4000 junior lien is entirely avoided. 
We now move on to the senior lien. According to section 522(f)(2)(B): "In the 
case of a property subject to more than [one] lien, a lien that has been avoided _shall 
not be considered in making the calculation under subparagraph (A) with respect 
to other liens. "74 As we have avoided the $4000 lien, it is no longer relevant. The 
initial sum we need is now the amount of the senior lien ($600), all other liens ($0, 
by virtue of section 522(b)(2)(B)), and the exemption ($2400). 75 From this sum 
($3000), we subtract the value of the car ($2650) to obtain $350.76 Therefore, the 
senior lien obtains $250 ($600 minus $350). The debtor obtains the exempt amount 
of $2400. 77 Both these security interests impair the exemption, one partially and 
the other entirely. Therefore, the junior security interest is entirely avoided and the 
68 Scott Everett, Comment, Debtors' Delight? Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: How Revisions to 11 U.S. C. 
§ 522 (j) Affect Debtors' Ability to Avoid Liens Which Impair Texas Personal Property Exemptions, 26 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1331, 1353 (1995). 
69 When Hamlet asks Rosencrantz and Gildenstern how they fared, the latter responded, "Happy in that 
we are not overhappy; On Fortune's cap we are not the very button." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE 
TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 2, SC. 2. 
70 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l)(B)(ii) (1994). 
71 Later, we shall see that A's $600 lien is valid for $250 and invalid for $350. See infra notes 74-77 and 
accompanying text. 
72 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994). 
13 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
14 Id. § 522(t)(2)(B). 
15 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
16 Id. 
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l) (1994). 
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senior security interest is partially avoided. This outcome does require the sensible 
restriction that one assess the most junior security interest before proceeding to 
those that are more senior. 78 
An alternative mode of calculation under section 522(t)(2) is possible. The 
alternative calculation would exploit the premise that a "lien" can never be for an 
amount in excess of the collateral. 79 To illustrate how this might work, imagine 
that A claims $600, B claims $4000, the exemption is for $2400, and the 
unencumbered value of the collateral is $3100. Because A's lien is for $600, B's 
lien, as we are now redefining it, is for $2500, not $4000. Per this definition, and 
applying the formula of section 522(t)(2)(A), we take the sum of B's targeted lien 
($2500), A's valid lien ($600), and the exemption ($2400); and from this sum 
($5500), we subtract the unencumbered value of the collateral ($3100). 80 The 
result is avoidance of $2400, leaving B with a lien of $100. 81 Given A's valid lien 
for $600, the debtor has an exemption worth $2400. This is precisely the result we 
would have reached if we defined B's lien by the amount of the total debt 
outstanding ($4000). Hence, it makes no difference whether "lien" is tied to the 
value of B's collateral or to the amount of B's total claim. 82 
A. Underwater Liens 
Suppose the senior unavoidable security interests eat up all the value of exempt 
property, and yet there are still some junior security interests that are themselves 
avoidable. Can section 522(t) be used to get rid of these liens, which are entirely 
under water?83 The answer is yes. Such unwanted barnacles may be scoured from 
the exempt property, thanks to the formula now provided in section 522(t)(2). 84 
For example, suppose A and Beach claims $1000, and each also claims the 
debtor's automobile as collateral. The debtor has convinced the court that the 
automobile. is a "tool" within the meaning of section 522(t)(l)(B)(ii). 85 The 
78 If we had started with A's senior security interest, A's lien would have been avoided entirely, but B's 
junior lien would have been valid to the extent of $250. 
79 See 11 U .S.C. § 506(a) (1994) (providing that a secured claim is an allowed secured claim "to the extent 
of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property"). 
so Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
81 Id. § 522(t)(l)(B). 
82 The phrase "secured claim" is supposed to be tied to the value of the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) 
(1994). But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992). A "secured claim" means the entire 
prepetition claim of an undersecured creditor, for purposes of§ 506(d). Id. In any case, the phrase "secured 
claim" is not used in§ 522(t)(2), and the word "lien" is not defined according to any quantitative criterion. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (1994) ("lien" defined as a "charge against or interest in property to secure 
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation"). 
83 See Howard, supra note 67, at 164-65 (referring to underwater liens as junior liens where debtor's 
exemption and senior liens exceed value of property). 
84 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2) (1994); see supra notes 52-66 for a discussion of the formula. 
85 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l)(B)(ii) (1994). 
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automobile has an appraised value of $2650. A's security interest is purchase 
money and hence not voidable under section 522(t)(l)(B). 86 B's security interest 
is voidable under section 522(±)-provided the court thinks that security, interests 
entirely under water impair exemptions. 87 
Applying the formula in section 522(±)(2), 88 we start with B's junior lien. 
Although nothing in section 522(±)(2) requires this point of departure, 89 we saw 
earlier that any other point of departure produces the absurd result of preserving the 
junior lien and avoiding the senior lien. 90 In light of this assumption, we take the 
sum of the most junior lien ($1000), all other liens ($1000),91 and the amourtt of 
the exemption ($2400).92 From this sum ($4400), we subtract the value of the 
collateral ($2650). 93 The result ($1750) represents the amount of avoidance. 94 
Hence, B's lien is entirely avoided. 
As to A's lien, we take the sum of the lien ($1000), other valid liens ($0),95 
and the exemption ($2400). 96 From this sum ($3400), 97 subtract the value of the 
86 See id. § 522(t)(l)(B) (providing avoidance only for nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security 
interests). 
87 Many cases took this position prior to 1994. See Henderson v. Belknap (In re Henderson), 18 F. 3d 
1305, 1310-11 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (allowing avoidance of $197,667 judicial lien when debtor had no 
equity above homestead exemption), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573 (1994); Harris v. Herman (In re Herman), 
120 B.R. 127, 132 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (Perris, J.) (allowing avoidance of junior lien where debtor's 
$75,000 exemption and $90,000 senior lien took up entire $149,500 value of collateral); Galvan v. Galvan 
(In re Galvan), 110 B.R. 446, 451-52 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (Meyers, J.) (allowing debtor to avoid $32,182 
junior lien when homestead with fair market value of $94,500 is encumbered by $82,207 senior trust deed 
and debtor has $45,000 exemption); In re Koehler, 167 B.R. 773, 775 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994) (Bucki, 
J.) (allowing to survive only portion of junior lien above senior lien and debtor's exemption); In re Bruton, 
167 B.R. 923, 926-27 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1994) (Adler, J.) (stating that junior lien is avoided entirely if 
debtor has no equity above senior liens and debtor's exemption); Wilder v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. (In re 
Wilder), 165 B.R. 413, 416 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1994) (Pearson, J .) (avoiding junior lien where debtor had 
no equity above senior liens and its exemptions); In re Cross, 164 B.R. 496, 500-01 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(Scholl, J.) (same); In re Finn, 151 B.R. 25, 28 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992) (Gerling, J.) (same); In re 
Berrong, 53 B.R. 640, 643 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (Brumbaugh, J.) (same); In re Rehbein, 49 B.R. 250, 
253-54 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (Glennon, J.) (same); In re Carney, 47 B.R. 296, 299 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1985) (Gabriel, J.) (same); see also Bowmar, supra note 40, at 388-89 (arguing in favor of permitting 
avoidance of junior liens where debtor has no equity above senior avoidable liens). 
88 See supra notes 52-66 (discussing § 522(t)(2) formula). 
89 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2) (1994) (containing no express rule for order of calculation of multiple liens). 
90 See text supra p. 66. 
91 This figure might be viewed as $250, because only that amount of the senior lien is valid. Whether 
$1000 or $250 is used, however, makes no mathematical difference, insofar as the junior lien's validity is 
concerned. 
92 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994). 
93 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
94 Id. § 522(t)(l)(B). 
95 It will be recalled that new § 522(t)(2)(B) prohibits us from adding in B's avoided lien here. Id. 
§ 522(t)(2)(B). 
% Id. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). 
97 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2)(A) (1994). 
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car ($2650) to find the extent of avoidance ($750). 98 This reduces A's lien from 
· $1000 to $250, so that A obtains $250 and the debtor takes her exemption of 
$2400.99 
In these calculations, the underwater portion of B's lien was eliminated. Prior 
to 1994, many courts took the position that section 522(t) could not apply to the 
underwater portion of a lien. 100 Presumably these cases are no longer viable 
because, under the calculations demanded by section 522(±)(2), the amount of 
avoidance is always sufficient to avoid the entire underwater portion of any 
lien. 101 
B. Marshaling of Assets 
The subordination of a valid security interest to one that is voidable under 
section 522(t)(l)(B) gives rise to a difficult marshaling puzzle that arose, but was 
not addressed, in In re Zimmel. 102 In Zimmel, a purchase money lender 
subordinated its security interest to that of a large nonpurchase-money agricultural 
lender. 103 The debtor was entitled to avoid at least part of this senior nonpurchase-
money security interest, 104 but not the subordinated purchase money security 
98 Id. § 522(f)(l). 
99 See id. 
100 See, e.g., Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(per curiam) (holding judgment lien could be avoided only to extent of exemption); David Dorsey Distrib., 
Inc. v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 39 F.3d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 1994) (Moore, J.) (stating appreciation of 
property should be subject to prior lien); City Nat'! Bank v. Chabot (In re Chabot), 992 F.2d 891,895 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (Sneed, J.) (noting exemption is not impaired unless it is diminished in value); Wachovia Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Opperman (In re Opperman), 943 F.2d 441,444 (4th Cir. 1991) (Ward, J.) (avoiding lien 
when it interferes with debtor's exemption). Compare In re Cross, 164 B.R. 496, 500 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1994) (Scholl, J.) (stating that Owen compels destruction of underwater liens under § 522(f)) with In re 
Harrison, 164 B.R. 611, 615 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (Squires, J.) (rejecting argument that Owen compels 
destruction of underwater liens). 
One court thought thatDewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) itself required that the underwater liens 
be left alone. In re Cerniglia, 137 B.R. 722, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992) (Meyers, J .). Other courts thought 
that a debtor has no property interest in overencumbered property. Opperman, 943 F.2d at 443-44; In re 
Cheek, 111 B.R. 828, 830 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (Schermer, J.). Still other courts admitted that the 
debtor has ownership of overencumbered property, but they found that the underwater lien does not "impair" 
any exemption. Menell v. First Nat_'! Bank (In re Menell), 37 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1994) (Cowen, J.); 
Simonson v. First Bank (In re Simonson), 758 F.2d 103, 109-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., dissenting); 
Alu v. New York (In re Alu), 41 B.R. 955, 957-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Wexler, J.); Washington v. Virginia 
State Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Washington), 41 B.R. 211, 216 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (Shelley, J.). 
None of these theories is very defensible, and because Congress has overruled them, any demonstration 
would constitute a digression. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1994). 
101 The legislative history specifically mentions an intent to overrule City Nat'! Bank v. Chabot, 992 F.2d 
891, 895 (9th Cir. 1993). 140 CONG. REC. Hl0,752, Hl0,769 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994). 
102 185 B.R. 786, 788 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (O'Brien, J.). 
103 Id. at 788. 
104 This part of the case is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 176-180. 
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interest. 105 In principle, it should be possible for the debtor to avoid the security 
interest on the exempt property and preserve it for her own benefit, at the expense 
of the subordinated purchase money lender who is entirely under water. 106 
For example, suppose the debtor owns two items of collateral-one exempt and 
one not, and both worth $100. The exempt item is purchase money collateral for 
B, who, as in Zimmel, has subordinated her purchase money security interest to the 
voidable security interest of A, who claims $100. 107 A could therefore take the 
nonexempt item, allowing B to take the purchase money collateral. Or the debtor 
could insist that A's security interest encumbers both items, permitting the debtor 
to avoid the security interest on the exempt item and forcing A to pursue the 
nonexempt item. The debtor could then assert the avoided security interest on the 
purchase money collateral against B's valid security interest. 
Is it fair for the debtor to use a voidable security interest that A does not even 
need to prevent B from getting at her collateral? The answer is yes, because B has, 
either contractually or by failing to perfect under state law, staked out a junior 
position as to the exempt item. The debtor's avoidance theory fully honors that 
junior position. Furthermore, B has no valid marshaling claim to direct A toward 
the nonexempt collateral. 108 Marshaling is, in general, a doctrine for the benefit 
of junior lien creditors. 109 It is appropriately used when a senior creditor claims 
two items of collateral, as in the above example, and where the junior creditor 
claims only one. 110 In such a case, the junior creditor can insist that the senior 
creditor first exhaust the singly encumbered collateral before returning to the doubly 
encumbered collateral. II 1 It is a rule of marshaling, though, that B cannot insist 
on marshaling when yet another junior creditor claims the other collateral. II2 In 
such a case, two junior creditors each have a marshaling claim against the senior 
creditor. 113 The two claims cancel each other out, and neither can insist that A 
choose one or the other of the doubly encumbered items.114 
105 Zimmel, 185 B.R. at 795. 
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(i)(2) (1994) (granting power to debtor to avoid in lieu of trustee's action). 
101 See Zimmel, 185 B.R. at 788; see also 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1994) (governing validity of subordination 
agreements in bankruptcy). 
108 See David Gray Carlson, The Trustee's Strong Arm Power in Bankruptcy, 43 S.C. L. REV. 841, 887-93 
(1992) (discussing requirements for bringing marshaling claims); see also Duck v. Wells Fargo Bank (In 
re Spectra Prism Indus.), 28 B.R. 397,399 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (Katz, J.) (discussing basic requirements 
that must be met before imposition of marshaling orders). 
109 Moses Lachman, Note, Marshaling Assets in Bankruptcy: Recent Innovations in the Doctrine, 6 
CARDOZO L. REV. 671, 671 (1985). 
110 Id. 
i11 Id. 
112 See Duck, 28.B.R. at 399 ("All parties agree that injury or prejudice to a third party constitutes 
adequate grounds to deny an order to marshal assets."). 
113 Id. at 399-400. 
114 See Carlson, supra note 108, at 887-93 (indicating marshaling is only proper when it will not result in 
prejudice to other parties); Lachman, supra note 109, at 672-73 (stating marshaling is only proper where 
result will not prejudice "the debtor, senior creditor, or third persons"). 
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Since the bankruptcy trustee is a hypothetical judicial lien creditor as of the day 
of the bankruptcy petition, 115 the trustee is just as entitled to marshaling as B is. 
Therefore, neither can direct A toward any item of collateral. Hence, even before 
the debtor enters the picture, B is disentitled to marshal in the above example. 116 
A is free, then, to take whichever item of collateral it wants, without any 
interference from either B or the trustee. 117 
Meanwhile, A's lien is voidable by the debtor as to the exempt property. 118 
As always, "voidable" is a misnomer in the Bankruptcy Code. It is avoided-but-
preserved.119 In other words, A's lien is transferred over to the debtor, for the 
debtor's benefit in preserving the exemption. 120 Now, if A has complete freedom 
to assert her lien against the exempt property, free from any objection by B or the 
trustee, and if the debtor is now the owner of A's lien, then the debtor has this 
freedom as well. 121 Therefore, the debtor should be able to rescue the exempt 
item from the purchase money security interest of B. 122 
In contrast, at least one case implies that the debtor has no right to marshal 
when a single secured creditor claims an exempt item as purchase money collateral 
and a nonexempt item as nonpurchase-money collateral. 123 The debtor cannot 
marshal against the purchase money security interest, and the bankruptcy trustee 
cannot marshal against the nonpurchase-money security interest. In this situation, 
the inability of either "junior lien creditor" 124 to marshal at the expense of the 
115 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (1994). 
116 Id. 
117 See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Center Wholesale, Inc. (In re Center Wholesale, Inc.), 788 F.2d 
541, 544 (9th Cir. 1986) (Beezer, J .) (noting that marshaling must avoid injustice to third parties, including 
other lien creditors). 
118 See supra text accompanying note 107 (defining security interest of A as avoidable). 
119 David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 211, 357; Tracy Springer, Note, An Individual Debtor's Right to Avoid Liens Under Section 506(d) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 263, 274 n.66 (1990). 
120 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(i)(2) (1994) (stating that lien that is avoided under§ 522(t) may be preserved for 
benefit of debtor). 
121 See id. 
122 At least one court has held that the lien preservation principle in§ 551 does not include expropriation 
of contractual subordination rights of the avoided secured party. In Robinson v. Howard Bank (In re Kors, 
Inc.), 819 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1987), Judge Lawrence Pierce ruled that, when a trustee avoided an 
unperfected senior security interest, the trustee could preserve the avoided lien but could not assert that lien 
creditor's subordination rights created in a collateral contract. Id. I have criticized the logic of this ruling 
elsewhere. See Carlson, supra note 108, at 863-72. Nevertheless, if the case is considered good law, it 
constitutes a reason why the debtor would not be able to maneuver an avoidance right under § 522(t)(l)(B) 
to the prejudice of a valid junior lien. 
123 Ivie v. Frey (In re Ivie), 165 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994) (Peterson, J .) (debtor not permitted to 
shift mortgages to nonexempt property in order to create equity in a homestead which could be 
disencumbered under § 522(t)(l)). 
124 The trustee is a lien creditor under the strong arm power. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (1994) (granting 
trustee rights and powers of lien creditor as of commencement of the case). The debtor's right to at least 
a monetary exemption in a thing has already been compared to a lien. See supra text accompanying notes 
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other is canceled. The debtor cannot argue that she has the rights of a senior lien 
creditor. Rather, the debtor is junior and is therefore subject to the rule that it 
cannot marshal at the expense of another junior lien creditor. In such a case, the 
secured party may choose either item of collateral without any interference from the 
bankruptcy trustee. 
C. Circular Priorities 
When a debtor can only exempt property up to a specific dollar amount, 125 
difficult circular priorities may arise. 126 Returning · to the example of the 
automobile, which is federally exempt to the amount of $2400, 127 suppose that A's 
security interest is voidable under section 522(f)(l)(B) but B's is not. 128 for 
example, suppose that B subordinated her purchase money security interest to the 
voidable nonpurchase-money security interest of A. 129 Or suppose that B forgot 
to perfect her purchase money security interest, while A has perfected its 
nonpurchase-money security interest. A's security interest is therefore senior, while 
the trustee has either not avoided B's unperfected security interest or avoided but 
preserved it for the benefit of the general creditors. 130 These circumstances imply 
a circular priority. 131 The debtor's exemption is senior to A (to the extent A 
impairs the exemption); A is senior to B; and B is senior to the debtor's 
exemption. 132 Indeed, where the debtor claims an exemption limited in dollar 
amount, it would appear that the debtor has as much of a lien on the exempt item 
as A or B. 133 
Under the new definition of impairment, A's $600 security interest is entirely 
void. Applying the formula to A's lien, we add the amount of that lien ($600), the 
68-69. 
125 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (1994) (entitling debtor to exemption of one motor vehicle, not to 
exceed $2400). 
126 See John C. McCoid, Preservation of Avoided Transfers and Liens, 77 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (1991) 
(indicating that circular priorities arise when trustee has priority over preferred creditor, who has priority 
over second mortgagee, that has priority over trustee). 
127 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (1994). 
128 See id. § 522(t)(l)(B) (allowing avoidance of only nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens). 
129 See In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786, 788 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (O'Brien, J.) (presenting parallel facts). 
130 The trustee can benefit from a voidable preference recovery when the avoided interest was voluntarily 
conveyed by the debtor. The debtor cannot step into the trustee's shoes and avoid any such lien. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(g) (1994). 
131 See McCoid, supra note 126, at 1099 (detailing circumstances that give rise to circular priorities). 
132 See, e.g. ,In re Baldwin, 84 B.R. 394, 396 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (Bentz, J.) (presenting similar facts 
illustrating circular priorities). 
133 Cf. Fisher v. Pennsylvania (In re Fisher), 117 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (Markovitz, J.). 
Where a debtor with a monetary portion and a creditor with an avoidable lien claim different pieces of 
collateral, the part of the lien not avoided still attaches to both pieces of property; apportionment to one 
piece only is not allowed. Id. 
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amount of all other liens ($4000), and the amount of the exemption ($2400). 134 
From this sum ($7000), we subtract the value of the car ($2650), for a total of 
$4350. 135 This constitutes the amount of avoidance to which the debtor is 
entitled-more than enough to kill off A's entire $600 lien. Furthermore, this 
distribution to the debtor out of A's share (before B receives anything) is required 
by section 522(i), which provides: 
( 1) If the debtor avoids a transfer or recovers a setoff under subsection 
(t) or (h) of this section, the debtor may recover in the manner prescribed 
by, and subject the limitations of, section 550 of this title, the same as if 
the trustee had avoided such transfer, and may exempt any property so 
recovered under subsection (b) of this section. 
(2) Notwithstanding section 551 of this title, a transfer avoided under 
section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, under subsection 
(t) or (h) of this section, or property recovered under section 553 of this 
title, may be preserved for the benefit of the debtor to the extent that the 
debtor may exempt such property under subsection (g) of this section or 
paragraph (1) of this subsection. 136 
This provision states that any lien avoided under section 522(t) is preserved for the 
debtor's benefit, to the extent that the debtor may avoid the lien under section 
522(g) or section 522(i)(l). 137 Hence, A's security interest is transferred over to 
134 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994). 
135 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
136 Id. § 522(i). 
137 Id. § 522(i)(2); Bowmar, supra note 40, at 397. One commentator argues against this reading of 
§ 522(i): 
Arguably, the reference in [§] 522(i)(2) to the exemption limitation of[§] 522(i)(l) is not 
pertinent in this context. Section 522(i)(l) permits exemption of property recovered by the debtor. 
When the debtor avoids a judicial lien, there is "avoidance" but no "recovery." The word 
"property" in[§] 522(i)(l) should be construed to refer to the physical subject matter of a lien and 
not to the lien itself. If the debtor avoids a transfer of property, the debtor may recover the 
property from the transferee, just as the trustee might have recovered such property had the 
trustee avoided the transfer. Arguably, however, the trustee does not "recover" a judicial lien that 
has been avoided. Even if, for certain purposes, a lien would be considered a type of property, 
a lien upon property of the debtor is not itself property of the debtor. The lien is not "recovered," 
because the lien, although the product of the avoided transfer, has not itself been transferred. The 
reference in [§] 522(i)(2) to "the extent that the debtor may exempt such property under . . . 
paragraph (1) of this subsection," should be connected to the earlier reference to a transfer 
avoided under subsection (h), not to one avoided under subsection (t). 
Id. at 397-98 (footnotes omitted). In other words, only security interests avoided under § 522(g) can be 
preserved. Security interests preserved under§ 522(t)-to which§ 522(i)(l) refers-cannot be preserved . 
. If Bowmar is right, then § 522(i) does not allow the debtor to take priority over the junior unavoidable 
security interest. See In re Koehler, 167 B.R. 773,775 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994) (Bucki, J.) (refusing to 
preserve an avoided judicial lien for the debtor's benefit). But Bowmar' s argument depends on the belief that 
the debtor does not "recover" property when she avoids a judicial lien. For Bowmar, "recover" means 
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the debtor, who may assert its priority against that of B's purchase money security 
interest. 138 
Prior to 1994, courts had to figure out for themselves what constituted 
impairment in a circular priority case. 139 Three solutions had been devised. The 
"expansive" approach awarded all of A's lien to the debtor. 140 This is the 
prodebtor approach Congress adopted in 1994 when enacting section 522(f)(2). 141 
It calculates impairment of the debtor's exemptio"n in a very ahistoric way-as 
calculated at the time of the bankruptcy petition. 142 The expansive approach 
admittedly encourages a debtor to give junior security interests on property solely 
for the purpose of squeezing out senior lien creditors. 143 
"regain possession of." As this is not a compelling definition of the word "recover," Bowmar's entire 
argument is vulnerable to rejection. 
138 See In re Blanks, 64 B.R. 467, 469 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) (holding that avoided lien could be 
considered preserved to defeat junior lien). 
139 See 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 39.2, at 1023 (1965) ("There 
has never been agreement on the correct solution of circular systems which arise . . . from . . . inconsistent 
rules .... "). 
140 Hazard v. Overhead Door Co. (In re Hazard), 113 B.R. 494, 497-98 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (Crabb, J.); 
In re Bradshaw, 156 B.R. 239, 243 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1993) (Lorch, J.); West v. West (In re West), 68 
B.R. 647,650 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (Ryan, J.); Losieniecki v. Thrift Consumer Discount Co. (In re 
Losieniecki), 17 B.R. 136, 138 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (Cosetti, J.); see also John T. Cross, The 
Application of Section 522(!) of the Bankruptcy Code in Cases Involving Multiple Liens, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 
309, 325-27 (1989) (stating that according to expansive approach, debtor could avoid liens to extent 
necessary to gain full advantage of its exemptions). 
141 H.R. REP. No. 835, supra note 17, at 52, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3361. 
142 See Nadel v. Mayer (In re Mayer), 167 B.R. 186, 188 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994) (stating exemptions are 
determined as of filing date); Harris v. Herman (In re Herman), 120 B.R. 127, 130 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) 
(same). 
143 Compare Silver v. Savings Bank (In re Fiore), 27 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (Krechevsky, 
J.) ("To allow the debtor to place a voluntary lien on his property, and thereby to eliminate [A's] lien 
through the use of§ 522(t) is an unjust result and should not be imputed to be Congress' purpose .... ") 
with Simonson v. First Bank (In re Simonson), 758 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., dissenting) 
(indicating that Congress must have known desperate debtors would further encumber their exempt property 
in order to stave off bankruptcy) and In re Green, 64 B.R. 462, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986) (Bayt, J.) 
(stating that legislative history allegedly supports exemption planning of this sort). If the debtor does attempt 
a squeeze-out, the security interest might be a fraudulent conveyance. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994). Of course, 
the secured party has a defense under § 548(c) to the extent the secured party gave value to the debtor in 
good faith. Id. § 548(c). Fraudulent conveyance liability therefore depends on secured party knowledge of 
the squeeze-out and such, it is avoidable by the trustee. Id. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(l). The trustee would then 
preserve the avoided security interest for the benefit of general creditors, to the consternation of the secured 
party. Id. § 551. Yet even this fraudulent conveyance theory could not keep the debtor from obtaining the 
exemption to the extent of A's lien, under the expansive approach, unless the court were willing simply to 
declare the exemption under such circumstances to be itself fraudulent. See Galvan v. Galvan (In re Galvan), 
110 B.R. 446, 452 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (Meyers, J.). The Galvan court stated that, 
the judicial lien creditor may wish to challenge the bona fides of consensual liens in order to 
establish fully if there is any impairment of the debtor's exemption rights. We believe that in the 
context of a contested matter brought under [§] 522(t)(l), a judicial lien creditor can gain the 
necessary access to judicial process to present its position fully. 
Id. That is, B's subsequent security interest for $4000 is avoided and preserved by the bankruptcy trustee, 
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The so-called "chronological" 144 approach split the difference and partly 
validated A's senior lien, but only to the extent the lien did not impair an exemption 
at the time it was created. 145 In the above example, A's lien for $250 would be 
valid. The draconian "waiver" approach denied all recovery to the debtor on the 
theory that the sum of all consensual security interests indicated that the debtor had 
waived all right to exempt the property from creditors. 146 
but the debtor can, in tum, avoid this security interest under § 522(t)(l)(B), since it is not purchase money. 
11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (1994). Meanwhile, A's lien can also be avoided under§ 522(t)(l)(B). Thus, the debtor 
cannot help but benefit from squeeze-outs under the new definition of impairment under § 522(t)(2). 
144 Cross, supra note 140, at 323-25. The chronological approach is loosely analogous to § 724(b), the 
section that governs the circular priority of the trustee's administrative expenses, which are senior to a tax 
lien, which is senior to any junior lien, which is senior to the trustee's administrative expenses. See 11 
U.S.C. § 724(b) (1994). In the above scenario, A's senior-but-avoided lien takes the place of the tax lien 
that is subordinated to the trustee's expenses. The debtor takes the place of the trustee. 
First, only $350 of A's security interest is void, and so $250 of it is good. The first distribution, 
therefore, is to A's valid secured claim of $250. See In re Shafner, 165 B.R. 660, 662 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1994) (Cordova, J.). This leaves $1200 to distribute-the amount of the debtor's exemption. Next, take A's 
remaining claim of $350 out of the proceeds, but do not give it to A, because this part of A's security 
interest has been avoided under§ 522(t)(l)(B). Rather, give it to the debtor, to the extent of the exemption. 
11 U.S.C. § 724(b)(2) (1994); see In re Rader, 144 B.R. 864 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992). Since the debtor's 
exemption is for $1200, this exhausts the subfund of $250 that would have gone to A but for lien avoidance. 
B cannot complain so far; all that we have done is to honor A's priority over B. Meanwhile, we have $850 
left to distribute. 
At this point, the valid part of A's secured claim has been paid, and the invalid part has been given to 
the debtor. Next, B has full priority to these remaining proceeds. See 11 U.S.C. § 724(b)(4) (1994). On our 
numbers, B takes the entire $850, which exhausts the fund. 
145 See Silver v. Savings Bank (In re Fiore), 27 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr. D. Conn: 1983) (Krechevsky, J.) 
(holding creditor's judicial lien not avoidable since at time lien attached it did not impair any potential 
exemption). 
146 Waiver was based on the complaint that, under either of the above distributive systems, the debtor 
walked away with an exemption ($350 worth or $600 worth respectively) when the junior purchase money 
secured party had not yet been paid. Following this instinct, some courts, prior to 1994, blocked the debtor 
by insisting that, to the extent valid junior security interests were created on exempt property, the debtor 
"waived" the right to avoid senior liens. Saturley v. Casco N. Bank (In re Saturley), 149 B.R. 245, 248-49 
(Bankr. D. Me. 1993) (Haines, J.); In re Murray, 105 B.R. 576,583 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (Goldberg, 
J.); In re Baldwin, 84 B.R. 394, 396 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (Bentz, J.). The Baldwin court noted that 
"when the debtor consents to the most subordinate mortgage on his property, he ratifies, by his consent, all 
of the prior [avoidable] liens then in existence on that property." Id. at 399. 
According to this approach, B's claim for $4000 means that the debtor has no right to avoid A's senior 
security interest. As a result, A's lien is entirely valid and, incidentally, still senior to B. In other words, 
A benefits because the debtor conveyed all equity to B. 
The waiver approach is in essence an application of the policy embodied in§ 522(g)(l). 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(g)(l) (1994). Section 522(g) indicates that if the debtor has voluntarily conveyed exempt property 
away and the trustee later recovers it under § 550(a), the trustee may keep it for the general creditors 
because the debtor has forfeited the exemption by proving that it was never really necessary for the debtor's 
fresh start after bankruptcy. Id.; cf In re Audey, 66 B.R. 52, 53 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (Cosetti, J.) 
(refusing to follow waiver theory because B's lien was not a voluntary conveyance but an involuntary tax 
lien).· 
Notice that, thanks to § 522(g)(2), this waiver idea does not apply if the debtor can avoid the security 
interest under§ 522(t)(l)(B). 11 U .S.C. § 522(g)(2)(1994). This cross-reference to§ 522(t)(l)(B) indicates 
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III. THE SECTION 522(f)(3) LIMIT 
Nonpurchase-money, nonpossessory security interests on qualified exempt 
property are voidable to the extent they impair exemptions, 147 except when section 
522(f)(3) applies. 148 The section 522(f)(3) limit applies only to "implements, 
professional books, or tools of the trade" and to "farm animals or crops. "149 If 
"crops" means "farm crops," not "household crops" within the meaning of section 
522(f)(l)(B)(i), then it can be said that the limit applies to security interests on the 
exempt items found in section 522(f)(l)(B)(ii) (income producing property). 
Nothing in section 522(f)(l)(B)(i) (consumer goods) is subject to the section 
522(f)(3) defense. 150 
Oddly, section 522(f)(3) limits the debtor from avoiding security interests not 
only on her own property, but also upon property of "a dependent of the 
debtor. "151 Yet, nothing in section 522(f) empowers a debtor to avoid the 
encumbrances of property of a dependent. 152 Section 522(f)(l)(B)(i) and (ii) both 
allow a debtor to avoid security interests on her own property, when that property 
is used by a dependent. 153 But this cannot mean that the debtor can avoid the 
secured obligations of dependents who are nondebtors. Hence, the reference in 
section 522(f)(3) is an unnecessary but harmless piece of nonsense. 
A. Conditions Precedent 
Whatever the limit in section 522(f)(3) means, it is subject to a pair of very 
difficult conditions precedent, to be found in subsections (A) and (B) of section 
522(f)(3). 154 Subsection (A) starts by requiring that state law either permit the 
waiver of exemptions under section 522( d) or prohibit the use of section 
522(d). 155 Most states prohibit the use of section 522(d), and so the condition in 
that the waiver approach cannot be applied to any case involving an Article 9 security interest on the 
personal property described in§ 522(t)(l)(B). See id. Additionally, the waiver approach ignores the opening 
clause of§ 522(t), which states that the debtor's avoidance power is "[n]otwithstanding any waiver of 
exemptions." Id. § 522(t). This suggests that the debtor can encumber her equity in exempt property without 
adverse consequences to the avoidance power, contrary to the cases following the waiver approach. 
147 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l) (1994). 
148 Id. § 522(t)(3). 
149 Id. 
150 See id. § 522(t)(l)(B)(i)-(ii). This reasoning arises based upon the limitation contained in subsection (i), 
that limits the exemption to crops for "personal, family, or household use." Id. 
151 Id. § 522(t)(3). 
152 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l) (1994) (indicating debtor's property being used by dependant is outside reach 
of lien avoidance). 
153 Id. § 522(t)(l)(B)(i)-(ii). 
154 Id. § 522(t)(3)(A)-(B). 
155 Id. § 522(t)(3)(A). 
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section 522(f)(3)(A) will usually be met. 156 But in states where the federal 
exemptions are still available, the meaning of section 522(f)(3)(A) is not entirely 
clear. 157 The section indicates that applicable state law must permit "a person to 
voluntarily waive a right to claim exemptions under subsection ( d). "158 This 
language may mean that state legislatures must affirmatively permit debtors to waive 
their exemptions in a loan agreement. Few or perhaps no states do so, and 
therefore perhaps the section 522(f)(3) limit does not apply in any state where it is 
still possible for debtors to choose the federal exemptions. Oddly, section 522(e) 
prohibits such waivers, 159 but perhaps the passage of an unconstitutional waiver 
law at the state level triggers the procreditor limitation on the debtor's avoidance 
power. This is not a sensible state of affairs. 
Section 522(f)(3)(A) may mean something else. It may simply mean that, if the 
debtor chooses the federal exemption, the limit does not ~pply. 160 But if the 
debtor chooses the state exemption, section 522(f)(3) curtails the debtor's ability to 
avoid liens. 161 Or, in other words, section 522(f)(3)(A) is met in any case where 
the debtor actually chooses state, and not the federal exemptions. 162 The 
legislative history supports this reading as follows: 
[This section] applies only in cases in which the debtor has voluntarily 
chosen the State exemptions rather than the Federal bankruptcy exemptions 
or has been required to utilize State exemptions because a State has opted 
out of the Federal exemptions. In such case, if the State allows unlimited 
exemption of property or prohibits avoidance of a consensual lien on 
property that could otherwise be claimed as exempt, the debtor may not 
avoid a security interest on the types of property specified above under 
Bankruptcy Code section 522(f)(2) to the extent the value of such property 
is in excess of $5000. This section has no applicability if the debtor 
chooses the Federal bankruptcy exemptions, which cannot be waived. Like 
other exemption provisions, the new provision applies separately to each 
debtor in a joint case. 163 
156 At present thirty-six states have opted-out of the federal exemptions. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 703.130 (West 1987); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 282 (McKinney 1984); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 627.10 
(West Supp. 1995). 
157 Fourteen states have not opted-out of the federal exemptions contained in§ 522(d). See supra note 156; 
see also In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786, 791 n.3 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (O'Brien, J.) (indicating that thirty-
five states have opted out of Bankruptcy Code exemptions). 
158 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(3)(A) (1994). 
159 Id. § 522(e). 
160 See In re Parrish, 186 B.R. 246, 247 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995) (Martin, J.) (indicating that§ 522(t)(3) 
limit only applies if debtor chooses state law exemptions). 
161 See·11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(3) (1994). 
162 Parrish, 186 B.R. at 247 (finding § 522(t)(3)(A) met when debtor chooses state exemptions). 
163 140 CONG. REC. Hl0,752, Hl0,770 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1995). 
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In In re Zimmel, 164 creditors suggested such a reading of section 522(t)(3)(A). 165 
But Judge Dennis O'Brien showed barely any desire to help out an inarticulate 
Congress and hinted that section 522(f)(3) simply might not apply in states ·where 
its residents have access to the federal exemptions. 166 
The second condition precedent, in section 522(f)(3)(B), requires that state law 
either (i) permit unlimited exemption of debtor equity in collateral, or (ii) prohibit 
avoidance of security interests on exempt property. 167 Thus, subparagraph (B) is 
met whenever state law authorizes exemptions unlimited in amount. 168 But, if the 
exemption has a monetary limit, then state law must affirmatively prohibit avoidance 
to comply with the second condition precedent. 169 
Louisiana, 170 Texas171 and Wisconsin172 have enacted laws that meet the 
condition. 173 According to one commentator, Texas had reacted to Owen v. Owen 
with II a feeble attempt to protect creditors' valid liens. 11174 Congress then 
responded with its amendment to section 522(f) in order to ratify what the Texas 
legislature had done. 175 Thus, Congress and Texas were involved in a procreditor 
dialectic to whittle down debtor protection under section 522(f)(l)(B). 
Other states, however, simply recognize that exemption statutes apply to judicial 
lien creditors, but never to secured parties under Article 9. 176 In Zimmel, Judge 
O'Brien ruled that mere inapplicability of exemptions to Article 9 security interests 
was not the same as an affirmative prohibition of avoidance. 177 Given the merely 
passive law of Minnesota, 178 coupled with monetarily limited exemptions, Judge 
O'Brien ruled that Minnesota debtors had unlimited avoidance rights on exempt 
property governed by a monetary limit. 179 Since Minnesota limited the farm 
equipment exemption to $13,000, the debtors had unlimited avoidance powers 
164 185 B.R. 786 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (O'Brien, J.). 
165 Id. at 791. 
166 See id. (indicating that plain meaning points toward no limitation where there is access to federal 
exemptions). 
167 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(3)(B) (1994). 
168 Id. 
169 Id.; Zimmel, 185 B.R. at 791. 
170 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:388l(B)(2) (West 1991). 
171 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1996). 
172 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 815.18(12) (West 1994); see also In re Parrish, 186 B.R. 246, 246 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wis. 1995) (Martin, J.) (finding that Wisconsin exemption law satisfies § 522(t)(3)(B)). 
173 But see Zimmel, 185 B.R. at 793 (finding that Minnesota exemption law does not satisfy second 
condition precedent). 
174 Everett, supra note 68, at 1331. 
175 H.R. REP. No. 835, supra note 17, at 56-57, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3365-66. 
176 See Zimmel, 185 B.R. at 793 (describing nature of Minnesota exemption iaw). 
111 Id. 
178 MINN .. STAT. ANN.§ 550.37 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996). 
179 Zimmel, 185 B.R. at 795. 
1996] EXEMPT PROPERTY AFTER 1994 79 
against nonpurchase-money secured parties. 180 Thus, at least in Minnesota, the 
limit is a dead letter. 
B. The Nature of the Limit 
When the section 522(f)(3) limit applies, the amount of lien avoidance no longer 
equates with the amount of impairment. 181 Rather, lien avoidance is a lesser 
amount. 182 Impairment is subject to a deduction, which is defined as the difference 
between the value of the collateral minus $5000. 183 According to section 
522(f)(3): 
In a case in which State law that is applicable to the debtor-
(A) permits a person to voluntarily waive a right to claim 
exemptions under subsection ( d) or prohibits a debtor from 
claiming exemptions under subsection (d); and 
(B) either permits the debtor to claim exemptions under State 
law without limitation in amount, except as to the extent that the 
debtor has permitted the fixing of a consensual lien on any property 
or prohibits avoidance of a consensual lien on property otherwise 
eligible to be claimed as exempt property; 
the debtor may not avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor or 
dependent of the debtor in property if the lien is a nonpossessory, 
nonpurchase-money security interest in implements, professional books, or 
tools of the trade of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor or farm animals 
or crops of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor to the extent the value 
of such implements, professional books, tools of the trade, animals, and 
crops exceeds $5000. 184 
Although the matter is not entirely clear, the section 522(f)(3) limit apparently 
requires a debtor to aggregate all "implements, professional books, tools of the 
trade of the debtor . . . or farm ,animals or crops of the debtor . . . to the extent the 
value of such implements, professional books, tools of the trade, animals and crops 
180 Id. Judge O'Brien tells the story of § 522(t)(3), which he refers to as the product of "special interest 
efforts." Id. at 793. According to this tale, Philip S. Corwin of the American Banking Association ordered 
up this amendment in order to reverse Owen v. Owen in Florida (the state that generated the litigation in 
Owen), Louisiana, and Texas (where two Fifth Circuit opinions had ruled in a manner abverse to the Owen 
rule). Id. at 793-94. Apparently, Corwin overlooked states like Minnesota, where exemption by monetary 
limits existed, but no affirmative prohibition of lien avoidance existed as a matter of state law. Id. Thus, 
even where Congress is entirely pliant and supine, the life of a lobbyist does not always run smoothly. 
181
. See 11 U .S.C. § 522(t)(3) (1994) (indicating that subsection (3) is a limitation on the avoidance 
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exceeds $5000. "185 It is possible, however, that Congress meant for the debtor to 
have a maximum of $5000 per item, instead of $5000 in the aggregate. The 
grammar of section 522(f)(3) suggests the latter aggregate approach is the 
answer. 186 Thus, if the debtor is subject to the section 522(f)(3) limit and has 
three items each worth $4000, the limit applies. The debtor can cJ,void some of the 
security interests, but must end up with a maximum exemption of $5000 spread 
over the three items. 187 
The section 522(f)(3) limit withdraws avoidance otherwise provided for under 
section 522(f)(l)(B). 188 Hence, we must first determine the extent to which a 
security interest impairs an exemption, per the formula of section 522(f)(2). 189 
The limit then withdraws avoidance of that security interest by a defined amount. 
The amount withdrawn is the difference between the value of the collateral and 
$5000. 190 Hence, it is wrong to think that section 522(f)(3) limits the debtor to 
exemptions worth $5000, or that avoidance is directly related to $5000. 191 Rather, 
the limit on avoidance is the difference between the value of the collateral and 
$5000. 
An example may help, or at least couldn't hurt. Suppose a debtor claims a 
$50,000 vehicle as an exempt tool of the trade. 192 The vehicle is encumbered with 
a $100,000 nonpurchase-money security interest. To determine whether the 
$100,000 security interest "impairs" the exemption, we apply the formula of section 
522(f)(2). 193 Accordingly, we take the sum of the suspect lien ($100,000), all 
other liens ($0), and the amount of the exemption ($50,000). 194 From this sum 
($150,000), we subtract the unencumbered value of the truck ($50,000). The 
amount of avoidance, then, is $100,000. 195 Under section 522(f)(2), the entire 
185 See In re Parrish, 186 B.R. 246, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995) (Martin, J.) (applying § 522(t)(3) 
limitation once to single lien on two tractors). 
186 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(3) (1994) (using plural nouns to refer to subject classifications of property). 
187 Accord Parrish, 186 B.R. at 248. Parrish applied the§ 522(t) limit in the aggregate. Id. This could be 
compared to § 547(c)(8), under which transferees are given a $600 exemption. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(8) 
(1994). Where the creditor has received several transfers, the issue arises whether the value of the items 
must be aggregated, or whether the secured party is protected for each transfer worth less than $600. David 
Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 
349-50. The better view is that aggregation is not permitted-the opposite result suggested here with regard 
to § 522(t)(3). Id. 
188 11 u.s.c. § 522(t)(3) (1994). 
189 Id. § 522(t)(2); see supra notes 52-66 (discussing fully the § 522(t)(2) impairment formula). 
190 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(3) (1994). 
191 Cf Parrish, 186 B.R. at 248. In Parrish, tractors were claimed as exempt. Judge Robert Martin allowed 
for lien avoidance up to $5000. He never assigned a value to the collateral, which § 522(t)(3) requires in 
order to perform the calculation described there. 
192 See Rainier Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 73 B.R. 149, 150-51 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) 
(Ashland, J.) (dealing with avoidance oflien on $52,000 logging truck), aff'd, 861 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(Brunetti, J.). 
193 11 u.s.c. § 522(t)(2) (1994). 
194 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). 
195 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
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$100,000 security interest is void, but section 522(f)(3) defends the security interest 
by the difference between the value of the collateral ($50,000) and $5000. 196 
Hence, the secured party has a $45,000 defense, and a security interest that survives 
in this amount. The debtor has a senior exemption "lien" of $5000 on the vehicle, 
and the secured party has a valid security interest on the remainder. 197 
While this result is sensible and in accord with the intent that the debtor's 
interest be limited to $5000, the limit is quite cruel when applied to cases where the 
debtor has an exemption limited by monetary amount. Suppose now that only 
$2400 of the truck is exempt. Once again we must apply the formula of section 
522(f)(2) to figure out whether the security interest "impairs" the exemption. 
Accordingly, we take the sum of the suspect lien ($100,000), all other liens ($0), 
and the amount of the exemption ($2400). 198 From this sum ($102,400), we 
subtract the unencumbered value of the truck ($50,000). The amount of avoidance, 
then, is $52,400. 199 Under section 522(f)(2), the $100,000 security interest only 
partly impairs the exemption. The secured party has a valid security interest for 
$47,600, and the debtor may avoid $52,400 of the lien. But section 522(f)(3) now 
works to withdraw some of that avoidance. Since section 522(f)(3) defends the 
security interest by the difference between the value of the collateral ($50,000) and 
$5000, the secured party has a defense worth $45,000.200 This amount must now 
be withdrawn from the avoidance of $52,400, so that the debtor can avoid only 
$7600 of the lien. Accordingly, section 522(f) reduces the $100,000 lien to 
$92,400. The truck is once again overencumbered, and the debtor has lost the 
exemption entirely. 
One commentator, Scott Everett, gives the following alarming example. 
Suppose three debtors each suffer from $10,000 security interests on property which 
they may exempt for $5000.201 The only difference is that the first debtor's 
property is valued at $5000, the second debtor's property at $7000, and the third 
debtor's property at $10,000.202 The first debtor emerges from bankruptcy with 
exempt property worth $5000, the second with property worth $4000, and the third 
with no exemption at all. 
In a reversal of typical roles, [section] 522(f) debtors would, in this 
situation, have every incentive during the bankruptcy case to increase their 
196 Id. § 522(t)(3). 
197 Accord Everett, supra note 68, at 1352; cf Ned W. Waxman, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 11 
BANKR. DEV. J. 311, 325 (1995). Professor Waxman describes§ 522(t)(3) as creating "a ceiling of $5000 
on the avoidance of a nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security interest." Id. His formulation is not 
precisely accurate, however. In the above example, lien avoidance equalled $55,000, well above the 
supposed $5000 ceiling he attributes to § 522(t)(3). 
198 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994). 
199 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
200 Id. § 522(t)(3). 
201 Everett, supra note 68, at 1354. 
202 Id. 
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surplus by showing how little their property is worth, while [section] 522(f) 
creditors would work to decrease the avoidance of their [section] 522(f) 
liens by showing how valuable the subject property is.203 
Everett also points out that, in Texas, debtors are better off choosing the $1500 
federal exemption for tools of the trade,204 instead of Texas's $60,000 aggregate 
personal property exemption. 205 The latter triggers the section 522(f)(3) limit, and 
the whole exemption may be lost. 206 The federal choice prevents the limit from 
being used. 207 At least this is so on a certain reading of section 522(f)(3)(A). 
Recall that perhaps section 522(f)(3)(A) has been met only if the debtor has 
"waived" the federal exemption by choosing the state exemption.208 On the other 
hand, section 522(f)(3)(A) may also mean that the section 522(f)(3) limit only 
applies in states where the debtor is permitted to "waive" exemptions by 
contract. 209 
In Zimmel, Judge Dennis O'Brien ruled that the section 522(f)(3) limit would 
not apply in any Minnesota case. 210 Minnesota provided an exemption on tools 
that was limited by monetary amount. 211 The above example shows that when 
exempt property is overencumbered, the debtor will lose the exemption altogether, 
if the section 522(f)(3) formula applies. Such a result strongly supports Judge 
O'Brien's conclusion in Minnesota cases, at least on policy grounds. 
In addition, the section 522(f)(3) limit is quite harsh when valid senior purchase 
money security interests encumber totally exempt property. Suppose a $45,000 
purchase money security interest and a junior $100,000 nonpurchase-money lien 
encumber a $50,000 truck. Applying the formula of section 522(f)(2), we take the 
sum of the suspect lien ($100,000), all other liens ($40,000), and the amount of the 
exemption ($50,000).212 From this sum ($190,000), we subtract the unencumbered 
value of the truck ($50,000). The amount of avoidance is $140,000.213 Under 
section 522(f)(2), the $100,000 security interest is entirely void. The section 
522(f)(3) limit now works to withdraw $45,000 worth of avoidance, so that the 
debtor can only avoid $95,000 worth of the security interest. 214 This leaves the 
secured party with a $5000 security interest, just enough to wipe out the debtor's 
203 Everett, supra note 68, at 1354. 
204 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (1994). 
205 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001-.002 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996). 
206 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(3) (1994); see also Everett, supra note 68, at 1356. 
207 Everett, supra note 68, at 1356. 
208 See supra part III.A (discussing conditions precedent to application of§ 522(t)(3)). 
209 Id. 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 177-180. 
211 In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786, 788-89 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (O'Brien, J.). 
212 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994). 
213 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
214 Id. § 522(t)(3). 
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$5000 exemption. Once again, the debtor has lost her exemption entirely. 215 
The section 522(±)(3) limit can also skew results between junior and senior 
nonpurchase-money creditors when they do not claim the same collateral. Suppose 
A claims $10,000 and is senior to a pair of exempt items each worth $4000. 
Following the "aggregate" interpretation of section 522(±)(3),216 A's collateral is 
worth $8000. Suppose B claims $10,000 and is junior to the two exempt items just 
mentioned, but senior as to a third item worth $4000. If section 522(t) did not 
exist, A should recover $8000 and B should recover $6000. Under section 
522(t)(l)(B) standing alone, all of these security interests are prima facie void. 
Thanks to the workings of section 522(±)(3), however, B recovers $6000, while A 
only obtains a lien worth $3000-an unfair result. First, we take the sum of B's 
total claim ($10,000), A's valid security interest (which will turn out to be $3000), 
and the debtor's exemption ($12,000).217 From this sum ($25,000), we subtract 
the unencumbered value of the collateral ($12,000), for avoidance of $13,000.218 
But, B has a defense of $7000 (the value of the collateral minus $5000).219 The 
debtor can only avoid $6000 worth of the security interest. Hence, B has a valid 
$4000 lien. This lien encumbers the item A could not reach. 
A is worse off than B, even though A is senior. We take the amount of A's lien 
($10,000), the amount of B's valid lien ($4000), the debtor's exemption ($8000 for 
the two items of collateral),220 and from this sum ($22,000) we subtract the 
unencumbered value of the collateral ($8000), for total avoidance of $14,000.221 
A obtains a defense under section 522(±)(3), however, for $3000 ($8000 -
$5000).222 The debtor can avoid $11,000 worth of A's lien, more than enough to 
wipe A out. Hence, A, a senior creditor, does worse than B, who is a junior 
creditor for two items and a senior creditor for only one. Obviously, this is an 
arbitrary and undesirable result. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1994 amendments to section 522(t) are only half successful. First, the 
amendments have added a very clear and concise definition of what "impairment" 
of an exemption means, for the purpose of lien avoidance under section 522(±)(1). 
This definition adopts the most prodebtor position existing in the diverse and 
unpredictable pre-amendment case law. Specifically, it adopts the prodebtor 
position taken by the Supreme Court in Owen v. Owen. 
215 See Everett, supra note 68, at 1351-52 (discussing similar example). 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 185-187. 
217 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994). 
218 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
219 Id. § 522(t)(3). 
220 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). 
221 Id. § 522(t)(2)(A). 
222 11 u.s.c. § 522(t)(3) (1994). 
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In contrast, the defense provided secured creditors under section 522(f)(3) is not 
well thought out. It is obtuse, absurd, and produces manifestly arbitrary and unfair 
results. While the idea of it is to prevent the debtor from avoiding security interests 
on extremely expensive tools of the trade, under certain circumstances, it ends up 
threatening the debtor's exemption altogether. It is clear that Congress will have 
to redesign the structure of section 522(f)(3). For example, Congress may wish to 
place a cap of $5000 on the exemption of any tool of the trade. This cap might 
apply to benefit unsecured as well as secured creditors. Alternatively, Congress 
may simply try a general standard instead of a specific formula for avoidance. For 
example, if section 522(f)(3) simply stated that, with regard to tools, the debtor may 
never exempt more than $5000 worth, the courts could then utilize the case law to 
smooth out the exact workings of the limit. These would be more sensible and less 
arbitrary ways to prevent debtor abuses of these valuable exemptions than the 
current formula. 
